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Abstract 
This study determined the effect of factors influencing residential property negotiation process on the final market 
outcome in Akure, Nigeria. The research design was field survey in which the target population were the property 
buyers within the three selected residential densities of the city.  Data was elicited from the self administered 
structured questionnaire to the 400 property buyers sampled. Data analysis was performed using logistic regression 
model where the dependent variable was market outcome and the independent variables were eleven dichotomous 
variables. The findings revealed that some variables showed significant values at p-value ≥ 0.05 influences on 
market outcome. These variables were agents’ commission, owners’ reservation prices, communication channel, 
property titled, duration of transaction, owners’ negotiators behaviours and neighbourhood characteristics. The 
variables that showed insignificant values of influence on market outcome were number of negotiators in each 
transaction, buyers’ reservation price, strategy employed, buyers’ negotiation behaviour; and cultural differences. 
There was information asymmetry between the owners’ negotiators and buyers as most of the buyers did not have 
an independent negotiators to strike a fair outcome (final price) The study therefore recommended two independent 
and  skilled negotiators who had the detailed knowledge of  information on the previous market condition and 
range  upon which to strike a fair deal. Equally there should be parallel market price regulatory agencies that must 
keep and regularly display past records of transactions. Such must be used to negotiate present transactions. No 
doubt this will break the information advantage that often make owners to have an edge over the buyers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Real property negotiations usually serve as means to settle buyer and seller interaction concerning final price, date 
of delivery, and service contracts (Sabine, Markus and Uta, 2009). The market is positioned in such a manner that 
sellers normally have in mind a particular price (reservation prices) below which the deal may not be successful; 
and the buyers want to pay less based on their reservation prices above which there may not be transaction.. To 
purchase the real property at a fair price, negotiation must take place. Such fair price should involve well informed 
negotiators or agents for both parties in order to strike fair deal. In practice especially in the environment where 
most of the market participants are not well informed about the operations of the market, the ideal things do not 
mostly prevail in most transactions. This situation leads to economic imbalance in which real property market 
characteristics actually exhibit. Due to relative fixity of the property, the property owners /sellers often have 
information advantages over the buyers. Hence, most property owners dictate prices or asking prices which may 
be the final price or market outcome.  Ack and Diaz (1996) argue that due to limited human information processing 
capacity, potential homebuyers often use the asking value on a home as a shortcut to arrive at negotiated / final  
value. Most often, asking price or value is the ceiling price for the negotiations between sellers and buyers on 
seller’s side, while negotiated value represent negotiators’ price targets as the best settlement between both parties. 
(Zetik & Stuhlmacher, 2002). Then, this depends on both negotiators’ (seller and buyer) skill and experience within 
the market.  
Market negotiation process requires quality representation of parties’ interests, sharing enough information, 
parties being in equal information power, negotiators whose motives, talent, and aspirations are not conflicting. In 
practice or reality, some of these processes that could lead to fair outcome are absent.  Muhlebach (2005) viewed 
that the outcome in the property market are set on an individual transaction basis and usually ends up in an 
agreement that is preconceived by conflicting negotiators or parties.  Thus an ill conceived negotiation process  
will cause most of the sub-optimal outcome experienced in property market transaction. Where the influence of 
one party on the asking price creates threat to the other party cannot allow   mutual beneficial outcome to prevail. 
Most property market outcome ends up in unequal bargaining in favour of owners more than the other party. This 
is not a rational situation for real property as an economic good.  
The real property market operations have come of age  within Akure city development. The city was once an 
administrative one in 1976 when Ondo State was carved out of the Western Region of Nigeria, with its capital seat 
at Akure has been advancing and growing both in population and land use development. The city actually enjoys 
a fairly flat physical and topographic terrain  that have encouraged sporadic residential land use development. 
Other features of interest are its commercial and industrial property developments which have been on the increase. 
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All these have necessitated establishments of professionals / service providers among whom the property 
managers/agents have been triumphing.  
However, within the Akure property market, there are no official or written  institutional arrangement on 
transactions.  Although there are professional properties managers being referred to as Estate Surveyors and 
Valuers that often handled the sales or letting of their clients’ real property. Their role in the market is not forced 
on any property owners or users. It all depends upon their desire to employ them for their professional services., 
while, some property owners handled their marketing and management of their real property by themselves.. So 
most of those property transaction, brokering, marketing and closing are handled by the property owners who do 
not keep any records or report their property activity with any authority or institution for  record keeping or as 
information databank. In sales or letting arrangement, there are no information or records  about past transactions 
within the market. So there is limited human information processing capacity among potential buyers. Most initial 
or asking price/ value from the property owners are often the final price. This situation suggest  that there are no 
negotiation process  in most deals, Final price ought to represents negotiated price targets from a buyers side, 
depending upon buyers’ skill. In practice, hardly can one observe a quality representative of all parties to 
negotiations because of lack of enough information on past transaction and lack of present information to facilitate 
greater success in negotiation. 
The institutional arrangement to co-ordinate the market transaction is therefore very weak. it lacks 
administration and monitoring of sales volume either from professional context, public agencies or other spirit-
fitted information providers. Yet, over the past two(2)-four(4) decades now, the volume of land transaction 
especially on private land in Akure city has been enormous. This has led to spontaneous expansion of land use in 
all the urban fringe areas of the city. There is therefore, need to investigate the market negotiation process that lead 
to most residential property transaction outcome in the Akure property market. The remaining aspect of the paper 
contains review of related works, research methods, discussion of results conclusion and recommendations. 
 
2.0  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Several studies have been carried out on market negotiation power, asking price, effect of agents on negotiation 
outcomes, real property marketing, time on market, factors influencing real estate property prices, anchor, 
reference and adjustment on price of commodities in United Kingdom, United States of America ( Bazeman, 
Curhan, More & Valley., 2000, Black and Diaz, 1996, Fatima, Wooldridge and Jennings, 2001; Wilhelmsson, 
2008, Messah and Kigige, 2011, Gatzlaff and Liu, 2013, and little has been done in respect of property market 
negotiation process and outcome in Nigeria  (Iroham et al, 2011a)  
For instance, Bazerman et al (2000) studied the effect of agents and mediators on negotiation outcomes, using 
multiple regression analysis, the study explored the influence of agents and alternative third-party termed 
mediators roles on negotiated outcomes and the likelihood of impasse/settlement. Findings revealed that the selling 
price of property is higher when an agent is used (because of agent’s commission) than when no intermediary is 
involved This arrangement still depend upon who the agent acted for. When the agent acts for the property owner, 
the potential buyer is often left in their whims and caprices. The ideal would have being that both parties have their 
separate agents to ensure fair outcome.  The study was carried out in United Kingdom and the extent to which 
professional estate agents or other third party  are involved in negotiation in Akure, Nigeria need to be studied.  
Black and Diaz (1996) research on the use of information on asking price in the  property negotiation process, 
using experimental method. The study revealed that there were manipulation on final price as buyers’ opening 
offer and eventual settlement price were based on buyers pre knowledge of the asking price.  The basis of 
negotiation would have been prevailing market range instead of asking prices with no recourse to market value of 
comparable properties.  Fatima, et al, (2001) investigation on optimal negotiation strategies for agents with 
incomplete information, analyzed the process of automated negotiation between two competitive agents that have 
firm deadlines and incomplete information about their opponent. The study developed a negotiation model based 
on factors of influence on outcome. It concluded that the outcome of a negotiation depends on many parameters 
which include the agents’ preferences, owners’ reservation limits, their attitude toward time and the strategies they 
employed. In an attempt to obtain the best price, agents usually ensure that negotiation ends before a certain 
deadline.; thus suggesting that  duration of transaction  influences negotiation outcome. 
This study intends to beef-up these variables of influence by adding communication channel, agent 
commission and others as part of the factors which can influence negotiation outcome.. For instance, 
owner/principal’ influence was found to impact upon market outcomes .in valuation brief (Amidu and Aluko, 
2007).  Although in most cases it is possible for agents to have complete information about all these parameters 
against its opponent. Wilhelmsson (2008) examined evidence of buyer bargaining power in the Stockholm 
residential  estate market. This study investigated whether uninformed buyers pay higher prices for single-family 
houses than informed buyers; and tests whether the bargaining power increases with information. Data on real 
estate prices and attributes were examined, as well as household characteristics and buying process. The results 
revealed that uninformed buyers pay higher prices than informed buyers  and bargaining power was not found to 
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be weak for a first-time buyer but it was weaker if the household had participated in several biddings and lost.  
This study intends to determine the extent to which bargaining process prevail in most outcome. 
Iroham, Oluwunmi and Oluwatobi (2011a) exposition on Principals’ Influence in Real Estate Negotiation 
entailed a survey of 159 Estate Surveyors and Valuers in Lagos metropolis, Nigeria. It was found that potential 
tenants were prompt in influencing real estate negotiation through the use of reward powers and information power 
as pecuniary gains are offered to the Estate Surveyors and Valuers (Agents) in order to accomplish their whims. 
Access to information by the principals is also used against the Estate Surveyor and Valuers working in an 
unfamiliar terrain. From the two findings in the study, it means both parties’ behaviours influences transaction 
outcome. 
Gatzlaff and Liu (2012) examined  list price information in the negotiation of commercial real estate 
transactions, Using a two-stage selection correction model, the study showed that office properties which provide 
list (asking) price information are (on average) associated with lower price outcomes signifying that both parties 
are well informed about negotiation outcome.  The study focused on commercial property and the extent to which 
negotiation prevails in residential properties transactions is desirable. 
Dirk, Moosmayer, Alain, Martin and Bjoern (2013) used neural network approach in predicting price 
negotiation outcomes in business to business context and compare the result  with regression analysis and the result 
reveals that target price played a more important role in price negotiation. The study was based on the influence 
of target price on negotiation of fungible commodity which is different from the heterogeneous nature of real 
property transaction. Target price can be likened to asking price but ought not to be arbitrarily fixed or monopolised. 
Leigh and Khakhar (2015) assessed the effect of negotiator characteristics on the success of international B2B 
negotiations through the online survey of international business executives working in the UK on the success of 
their most recent negotiating experience in terms of integrative and distributive outcomes. Employing chi-square 
statistical analysis showed that the respondents’ individual motivation appears to have a negative effect on 
integrative outcomes while, as expected, the other characteristics had a positive effect. The study was carried out 
on business services / commodity and not on real estate transactions. 
Furthermore, conventional wisdom has long maintained that some people are good negotiators and others are 
not (Thompson 2005). Here, the successful negotiation can be attributed primarily to natural skill or talent. Neil 
and Kevin (1995) argued from this standpoint that, a good negotiator is a very skilful communicator, a person who 
has developed their interpersonal skills to the point where reflective listening, assertion, interest-base questioning, 
and facilitation are their second nature.  Swaidan (2007) also pointed out that  cultural factor and language 
differences influence the negotiations process among parties 
In conclusion, this study considered  the influence of those  factors that have been established from literature 
(agents commission, owners and buyers reservation prices, communication skill;  channel strategy employed, 
owners’ and buyers’ negotiators behaviour, cultural differences, duration of transaction, property titled  and 
neighbourhood characteristics)  as the factors influencing negotiation process on the market outcome. Its findings 
would be of immense benefit to potential  buyers and tenants in real  property transactions and the possibility of 
employing the services of skilled negotiators (Estate Surveyors and Valuers) in order to achieve fair outcome in 
property transaction.. 
   
3.0 MATERIALS AND  METHODS 
The study was a field survey research which target population were  the prospective land/property buyers in the 
three residential densities selected for the study. The sample size  of buyers within the three areas were 400. The 
property buyers negotiators’ details were obtained  from the revenue department of the Board of Internal Revenue 
of the State  Stratified and systematic random sampling were adopted to group the residential areas into low, 
medium and high zones to elicit information from land/property buyers.. Structured questionnaire was later 
designed to collect relevant data from the buyers for the analysis. The method of analysis employed inferential 
statistic of Logistic regression to analyze the effect of the factors that influence negotiation process on the market 
outcome in the study area. The nominal variable is the dependent variable while the measurement variable is the 
independent variable and it takes the form of the equation below: 
Logit (p) = b0 + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 +...................+ b n X n.............................( 1) 
Where p = dependent variable ; b0= constant;   b1, b2, b3,........bn = regression coefficient 
            X1, X2, X3,........Xn= independent variables; and  n = number of predicted variables 
For this study, multiple/ logistic regression was used to analyse the effects of the factors that influence 
negotiation outcomes of most property transactions in  the study area. The dependent variable was the market 
outcome which took the form of categorical data of fairness or otherwise(unfairness). There were twelve 
independent variables in which their measurement scales  were dichotomous in order to avoid multi - co linearity 
problem among them. These were number of negotiators, agent/negotiators commission,  seller and buyers 
reservation price, communication channel between parties or their negotiators, strategy employed, sellers’ and 
buyers’ negotiators behaviours, parties cultural differences duration of transactions, property titled and 
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neighbourhood characteristics with their scale of measurement in table 1 below. 
Table1:  Specification and Definition of Variables Used 
 Variable Code Definition of Variables Measurement Scale 
NEGOUT Dependent Variable: 
Negotiation Outcome 
 
1= Fair Outcome; 0= Otherwise 
Independent Variables: 
NUNEGO Number of Negotiator in 
 Transactions  
1= Seller negotiator only 
0= Both Parties have  negotiators 
AGENCO Agents Commissions seller/ buyer Actual  % 
SEREPRI Seller Reservation Price 1=Higher than Market range 
0=Deadlock 
BUREPRI Buyer Reservation  Price 1-  same as asking  price 
0= Lower than Asking Price 
COMMCH Communication Channel between Parties 1=Face-to-face 
0= other means 
STRATEM Strategy Employed 1= Listening and Sharing Information 
0= otherwise 
OWNEGOB Owner’  Negotiator Behaviour 1=  Increase in Market range 
0= No Increase 
BUYNEGOB Buyer  Negotiator Behaviour 1= Decrease in  Asking Price 
0= No decrease 
PCULTD Parties’ Cultural Differences  1= Same  Culture 
0= Different Culture 
DURATR Duration of Transaction Actual Month 
PTITLED Property Titled 1=Available . 0 = otherwise 
NEIGHBCH Neighbourhood  Characteristics 1 = serene one ,, 0= otherwise 
  
4.0 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
In this section, data collected for the analysis were obtained through the structured questionnaire administered to 
the 400 property buyers within the three selected residential densities, out of which 369 were retrieved representing 
92 percent response rate being used for the analysis needed. 
Table 2: Socio-Economic Background of the Buyers/Occupants in the Three Residential Densities in Akure 
Socio-Economic Background of the
Property Buyers/Occupants 
High Density  Medium Density Low Density  
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Respondents Age       
Below 30 Years 8 4.9 6 5.4 6 6.4 
31 - 40 Years 43 26.4 27 24.1 26 27.7 
41 - 50 Years 56 34.4 37 33.0 34 36.2 
51 - 60 Years 40 24.5 30 26.8 20 21.3 
61 Years and above 16 9.8 12 10.7 8 8.5 
Total 163 100.0 112 100.0 94 100.0 
 Gender       
 Male 121 74.2 85 75.9 70 74.5 
 Female 42 25.8 27 24.1 24 25.5 
 Total 163 100.0 112 100.0 94 100.0 
 Educational Qualification       
 OND 27 16.6 15 13.4 18 19.1 
 HND 40 24.5 24 21.4 28 29.8 
 B. Sc 48 29.4 37 33.0 24 25.5 
 M. Sc 32 19.6 24 21.4 16 17.0 
 PhD 16 9.8 12 10.7 8 8.5 
 Total 163 100.0 112 100.0 94 100.0 
Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development                                                                                                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online)  
Vol.12, No.8, 2021 
 
54 
Socio-Economic Background of the
Property Buyers/Occupants 
High Density  Medium Density Low Density  
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
 Occupation       
 Civil Servants 48 29.4 35 31.3 24 25.5 
 Self-Employed 32 19.6 24 21.4 16 17.0 
 Private Company 74 45.4 48 42.9 48 51.1 
 Retired Person 9 5.5 5 4.5 6 6.4 
 Total 163 100.0 112 100.0 94 100.0 
 Marital Status       
 Single 18 11.0 10 8.9 12 12.8 
 Married 113 69.3 78 69.6 66 70.2 
 Divorced 24 14.7 18 16.1 12 12.8 
 Widow 8 4.9 6 5.4 4 4.3 
 Total 163 100.0 112 100.0 94 100.0 
 Monthly Income       
 Less than #30,000 9 5.5 5  4.5 3 3.2 
 #30,001 - #50,000 12 7..3 7  6.3 6  6.4 
 #50,001 - #70,000 56 34.4 36 32.1 32 34.0 
 
#70,001 - #90,000 













 Total 163 100.0 112 100.0 94 100.0 
 Plot Size       
 15m x 30m 131 80.4 88 78.6 78 83.0 
 18m  x 36m 16 9.8 14 12.5 8 8.5 
 36m  x 72m 8 4.9 5 4.5 4 4.3 
 30m x 30m 8 4.9 5 4.5 4 4.3 
 Total 163 100.0 112 100.0 94 100.0 
Table 2 described the socio-economic background of the property buyers/ occupants of the high density, 
medium and low density residential areas within Akure city. Various characteristics such as the age, gender, 
educational qualification, occupation, marital status, monthly income amongst other were shown to justify the 
reliability of the data needed for subsequent analysis in this study. 
The descriptive statistics in table 2, revealed that majority of the buyers across the three densities are within 
the age bracket of 41-50 years representing 34.4%, 33% and 36.2%t  respectively. This was closely followed by 
the buyers within the age bracket of 31-40 years representing 26.4%, 24.1% and 27.7% in the high, medium and 
low density areas. The age distribution of the buyers thus showed that they were advanced in age. Therefore, their 
opinion relating to the effect of the negotiation process on market outcome should be adequate. 
The gender distribution was mostly male representing 74.2%, 75.9% and 74.5% among the property buyers 
in the high, medium and low density areas. These percentages showed  higher number of male than female buyers 
in the selected areas in Akure. Their gender distributions relative to their educational qualification revealed that 
most of the buyers in the high and medium density areas are learned with B.Sc holders representing highest 
percents of 29.4% and 33% respectively. The buyers/occupants within the low density areas were mostly HND 
holders representing 29.8%. than the  HND holders in the high and medium density areas  (24.5% and 21.4%). 
The educational qualification of the respondents as shown in table 2 above showed that the buyers sampled were 
well educated and their opinion the subject matter would  be accurate. 
The data on buyers’ occupation also revealed that most of the respondents were working in private 
establishment/ companies representing 45.4%, 42.9% and 51.1% within the three areas (high, medium and low 
density) respectively. The civil servants represents 29.4%, 31.3% and 25.5% respectively while the self-employed 
represents 19.6%, 21.4% and 17.0% as opined by the occupants in the high, medium and low density areas. The 
marital status of the respondents revealed that most of the buyers  are married representing 69.3%, 69.6% and 70.2%  
in the high, medium and low density areas. The findings of the occupation and marital status further implied that 
these buyers were matured enough to understand the essence for the study. 
The data on the monthly income of the buyers also showed that most of them in the  three areas received 
minimum of #50,000 and above representing 87.2%, 89.2% and 80.4% respectively. These showed that their 
economic status should be able to influence their decisions From the perspectives of the occupants in the medium 
densities, majority of respondents collect #70,000 and above representing 39.3% and those within #50,001 - 
#70,000 represents 32.1%. The plot size of the property mostly purchased by the buyers within the three densities 
was  15m x 30m representing 80.4%, 78.6% and 83.0% within the high, medium and low density areas respectively. 
This implied  the preference for that plot size among the layout in the areas. 
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4.2 EFFECT OF NEGOTIATION PROCESS ON THE MARKET OUTCOME 
4.1. Logistic Model Fitness Tests 
Binary logistic regression was explored to assess the effect of the factors that influence negotiation outcome in the 
study area. Before the model, the adequacy of LRM is evaluated by considering the overall model evaluation, 
statistical test of each predictor, goodness-of-fit test and validation of predicted probability. The result of the 
analysis in tables 2,3 and 4 are discussed to ascertain the adequacy and reliability of the LRM is presented below. 
Table 2: Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
  Chi-square Df Sig. 
Step 1 
Step 124.194 12 .000 
Block 124.194 12 .000 
Model 124.194 12 .000 
Table 2 gives us an overall indication of how well the model performs over and above the results obtained 
for classification table (when no predictor variables was entered into the model) which is referred to as a “goodness 
of fit” test. This set of result shows the goodness of fit and the adequacy of the predictors in the model by having 
a lower chi-square of 124. 194 and a highly significant value which is  less than 0.05. Hence, the result from Table 
16 shows a significance of 0.000 which means that the value of p < 0.005. Thus, the model with the set of variables 
used as predictors is adequate; and that all the predictors have influence on the negotiation outcome  
Table 3: Classification Table a 
 Observed Predicted 
 Negotiation Outcome Percentage 
Correct  Unfair Fair 
Step 1 
Negotiation Outcome 
Unfair 22 25 46.8 
Fair  5 317 98.4 
Overall Percentage   91.9 
a. The cut value is .500 
Table 3 provides an indication of how well the model is able to predict the correct category (unfair/fair 
outcome). The  overall percentage 91.9 falls within the recommended standard of a good model which is between 
71 percent and 95 percent (FOQ, 2012) 
Table 4: Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square Df Sig. 
1 2.162 8 .976 
Table 4 shows the goodness of fit which statistics which asserts the fit of a LRM against actual outcome. The 
Homer and Lemeshow is used to test whether there is no relationship between the predictors variables and the log 
odds of the response  variable. Peng et.al (2002) asserts that when this test is not significant, then it suggests that 
the nodel fits the data well. In  the table 4, the chi square statistics figure is 2.162 (p=0.976) which is nor significant . 
This implies that  there is relationship between the weighted combination of the predicted variables and the log 
odds of the criterion variable. .  
Table 5:  Summary Variation on Cox & Snell R-Square and Nagelkerke R-Square 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 157.249a .286 .536 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 7 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001. 
Table 5  reveals the Cox and Snell  R Square and the Nagelkerke R Square values which provide an indication 
of the amount of variation in the dependent variable explained by the model (from a minimum value of 0 to a 
maximum value of approximately 1). The two values 0.287 and 0.536, suggest that the model is adequate as not 
much variation is observed between the two values and  the factors explain between 28.7% and 53.6% of the 
variability in the factors influencing negotiation outcome. 
 
4.2 Variables of Influence on Negotiation Outcome in the equation 
Table 6 showed the logit regression result with coefficient (B) of independent variables, significant (sig) odd ratio 
(Exp B) of each of the independent variables.. The findings revealed the variables/factors that influenced market 
outcome. In the significant column, values less than 0.05 are variables that contribute significantly to the predictive 
ability of the model, they are significant at p value  0.01 𝑎𝑛𝑑 , 0.05  while values greater than 0.05 were 
variables that do not contribute significantly to the predictive ability of the model. 
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Table 6: Variables in the Equation in Effects of Factors influencing Negotiation Process 




AGENCOM 2.089 .676 9.552 1 .002 8.076 2.147 30.372 
OWREPR 1.285 .288 19.844 1 .000 3.613 2.053 6.358 
COMMCH -2.499 .750 11.087 1 .001 .082 .019 .358 
PTITLED 3.113 .693 20.147 1 .000 22.480 5.775 87.513 
DURATR -2.713 .727 13.907 1 .000 .066 .016 .276 
STRATEM -.177 .194 .836 1 .361 .838 .573 1.225 
OWNEGOB 1.878 .680 7.628 1 .006 6.543 1.725 24.810 
PCULDF -.889 .919 .935 1 .333 .411 .068 2.490 
NUNEGT -2.905 .752 14.916 1 .067 .055 .013 .239 
BUNEGOB -1.294 .753 2.951 1 .086 .274 .063 1.200 
NEIGHBCH 2.123 .575 13.637 1 .000 8.357 2.708 25.791 
BUREPR -2.280 .567 16.152 1 .072 9.781 3.217 29.742 
Constant 1.761 2.284 .594 1 .441 5.818   
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Agencom, Owrerpr, Commch, PTitled, Duratr, Stratem, Ownegob, Culdf, 
Nunego, Bunegob, neighbch Burepr. 
Thus, the significant variables in the model were agent commission, owners reservation price, communication 
channel, property titled, duration of transaction, owner negotiators behaviour and neighbourhood characteristics. 
The insignificant variables were strategy employed, cultural differences, number of negotiators, buyers behaviour 
and buyers reservation prices   
Also, the B values showed the direction of the relationship (positive or negative). Negative B values indicated 
that an increase in the independent variable score would  result in a decrease probability of the case recording a 
score of 1 in the dependent variable (Negotiation outcome). Thus, communication channel, duration of transaction, 
strategy employed, owners’ negotiator behaviour, cultural differences , number of negotiators and buyers’ 
negotiators behaviour showed negative B values (-2.499, -2.713, -0.177, -0.889, -2.905, and -1.294) respectively. 
The positive B values indicated the  key variables of influence on negotiation outcomes observed in the selected 
areas. Agents commission had a positive significant relationship. The factor was 2.089 showing that there is a (two) 
time possibility of belonging to the party that will pay the commission irrespective of its effect on  negotiation 
outcome. 
The variables in the equation output also included the Exp(B). known as the odds ratio predicted by the model. 
Exp(B) –  is the exponentiation of the B coefficient, which is an odds ratio.  This value is given by default because 
odds ratios can be easier to interpret than the coefficient, which is in log-odds units. In the model, for  instance, 
the agents commission e 2.089 = 30.372. , signifies that the odds of deciding to continue the analysis are 30.372 
times higher than others for influencing the negotiation outcome. 
The model for the effect of factors influencing negotiation outcome is as shown below: 
Negotiation Outcome (y) = 1.761 + 2.089Agents Commission + 1.285 Owner Reservation  Price  
– 2.499 Communication Channel + 3.113 Property Titled – 2.713 Duration of the Transaction – 0.177Strategy Employed + 1.878 Owner Negotiator 
Behaviour – 0.889Party Cultural Difference -  2.905 Number of Negotiators in Transaction – 1.294 Buyer Negotiator Behaviour  + 2.123 Neighbourhood 
Characteristics - 2.280 Buyer Reservation Price ..................(2) 
The findings of this study are in agreement with the studies of Thompson (2005, 2007), Iroham et.al (2011a),  
amongst other which noted that several factors such as agent commission, attitude toward time, strategy used, 
reservation prices from both parties,, negotiators’ behaviours  and communication channel influence the fairness 
or otherwise of the  negotiation outcome 
Market negotiation ought to bring mutually beneficial outcome where both parties have equal information 
processing capability. In this study there was information assymetrry occasioned by buyers whose market 
information on previous transaction  is absent and does not have reservation price to contend with the asking price 
of the owners’ negotiators skill 
Agents equally believed that the reservation price of the property owners as their clients often is their asking 
price which is mostly inconsistent with prevous market information, thereby leading to unfair/inefficient/ 
suboptimal outcome from buyers’ viewpoints. Buyers’ negotiation behaviour and reservation price even when 
required lower prices  is mostly nil so the deal are mostly owners driven and super-optimal due to owners’ 
information advantage over the second party-buyer. Since most transaction do not have independent buyers 
negotiators, the basis of analysing market information to determine market range  and negotiate a fair outcome 
within that range in most transaction is conscupiously absent, hence unfair deal. This result is consistent with the 
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result in Black,(1997) which stated that erroneous pricing information is often set by property owner and his agents; 
and with lack of knowledge of buyers to have adequate adjustment/ negotiation, the problem solving process may 
yield erroneous solutions/ bias and unfair outcome. 
The duration of transaction too has not allowed fair outcome. Owners and his agents always desire quick sale, 
presenting the deal as one with many competitors which makes buyer to have been reaching agreement with them 
(for fear that they might lose the offer and there are no choice) even when the asking price is too high. This result 
is similar to –Fatima, Wooldridge and Jennings, 2004 
Equally a negative communication channel to fair outcome shows that parties do not share enough 
information especially pricing information and so very consistent with McGinn and Keros 2003 that parties who 
share enough information are more likely to negotiate better that parties who either do not share or does differently.  
 
5.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
The study build on the established factors that could mostly influenced negotiation process of residential properties 
within a medium sized Akure city in Nigeria towards the final price of transaction known as market outcome. The 
dependent variable was the market outcome whether it was fair outcome or not. There were twelve independent 
variables namely; number of negotiators, whether it was seller or both parties negotiators;  Agents commission 
from seller/buyer or both and the actual percentage;  sellers’ reservation prices whether it was higher than market 
range or not; buyers’ reservation price whether its same as asking price or lower than it; communication channels 
between the parties whether its face to face or otherwise; strategy employed whether it was listening and sharing 
information or otherwise, sellers negotiation behaviour whether it was increase in market range or not. buyers’ 
negotiations behaviours, no decrease in asking price or not; parties cultural differences whether parties were from 
same culture or not, duration of transactions in actual month/year; property titled  or not; and neighbourhood 
characteristics whether in a serene environment or not. Thus, communication channels, duration of transaction, 
strategy employed, owners’ negotiator behaviour, cultural differences , number of negotiators and buyers’ 
negotiators behaviour showed negative beta values signified  decreasing effects on the market outcome. The 
positive Beta values variables of influence on negotiation outcomes were agents commission, seller reservation 
price; titled property, sellers’ negotiation behaviours and neighbourhood characteristics indicated increasing 
effects on the market outcome. Those variables of positive/increasing and negative /decreasing effects seem to 
show unfair outcome from the buyers’ viewpoints.  Yet, there were no cases of no deal/transactions despite high 
asking price that characterised most transactions. It was clear  that previous years market sale to determine market 
range upon which the final outcome could have been based might not be considered. This suggests market bias, 
erroneous pricing and outcome that are economically imbalance and mutually un-beneficial. 
The study therefore recommends detailed knowledge and understanding of the previous years market price, 
and present market range for buyers to strike a fair deal. This can be achieved through an independent skilled 
negotiator to achieve beneficial outcome Equally, the monopolistic advantage of the property owners and their 
agent must be broken by a parallel bodies that must be keeping the records of past landed properties sale / letting 
transactions and publicly displaying such information for the general public by market price regulatory agencies 
through a sensitisation /enlightenment campaign against undue influence in the market. 
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